Clarity from the Italian Constitutional Court: Judgment No. 142/2025 and the Affirmation of Family-Centric Iure Sanguinis

Judgment No. 142/2025, published on July 31, 2025, was a highly anticipated decision that declared inadmissible the various questions of constitutionality regarding the 1992 Citizenship Law, which were posed by the Courts of Bologna, Milan, Rome, and Florence.

The questions challenged the constitutionality of Article 1(1)(a) of Law No. 91 of February 5, 1992, which establishes citizenship from birth for "the son of a citizen father or mother" without any generational limit. The appealing courts argued this provision violated Article 1, second comma, concerning the notion of "the people," and Article 3 of the Italian Constitution, regarding the principles of reasonableness and proportionality.

Other relevant articles included Article 117(1) of the Constitution regarding international obligations, specifically in relation to Article 9 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and Article 20 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), which define European citizenship. In the first three questions presented (all except for Florence's), it was asserted that the challenges were based on the applicants' lack of substantial links with the Italian community beyond filiation. However, this assertion was largely a presumption by these courts, made without verification.

The Courts of Rome and Milan also alleged discrimination under Article 3 of the Constitution, citing differentiated and unreasonable treatment on several fronts:

The Court of Rome focused on unequal treatment concerning the acquisition of citizenship by descendants of those who had lost their citizen status, as per Article 4(1) of Law 91/1992.

The Court of Milan focused on the unreasonably unequal treatment in the acquisition of citizenship by the spouse of an Italian citizen.

In its judgment, the Constitutional Court acknowledged that citizenship acquisition iure sanguinis is well-established in jurisprudence as an originary title (Constitutional judgment No. 30/1992 and Court of Cassation judgments No. 25317 and 25318/2022). Citing these same sources, the Court affirmed that the status civitatis (status of citizenship) founded on the bond of filiation has a "permanent and imprescriptible character [and] is justiciable at any time based on the simple proof of the acquisitive legal fact being fulfilled by birth to an Italian citizen."

In essence, this confirms that citizenship by descent is permanent, cannot be lost over time, and can be judicially recognized at any point by proving birth to an Italian citizen.

The Court also noted that "to date, this Court has never been tasked with ruling on the questions of constitutional legitimacy that are at issue in the present cases." It clarified that it had previously ruled on "entirely different challenges regarding the same provision," such as the lack of a rule allowing citizenship acquisition through the maternal line (Judgment No. 30 of 1983), but not on the lack of a rule limiting ius sanguinis for those born and residing abroad with another citizenship. This important recognition of fundamental principles serves as a reaffirmation and clarification for future rulings.

A tone of reproach can arguably be detected where the Court states, "it is patently obvious that the referring judges, in requesting an additive and manipulative intervention to Art. 1, paragraph 1, letter a), of Law no. 91 of 1992, implicitly considered that its literal text could not encompass the complex and multiple additions they proposed."

The court states that birth is the prerequisite for acquiring status filiationis (the status of a child as a descendant of its parents), but it is this status as a child that constitutes the legal title for acquiring status civitatis. While potentially open to other interpretations, this paragraph reaffirms citizenship from birth, consistent with the aforementioned jurisprudence.

The decision also provides a basis for future applications where it states that "this Court recognizes 'that the legislator enjoys broad discretion in regulating the attribution of citizenship' (judgment no. 25 of 2025)." However, it immediately qualifies this by stating that such rules "are not for this reason exempt from constitutional review, inasmuch as they must always be carried out according to canons of non-manifest unreasonableness and proportionality."

The Court referenced judgment No. 30 of 1983, which found a violation of Article 3 in a rule that granted original citizenship only through the father, as an example of discriminatory criteria it had previously struck down. Here, the Court is arguably developing an established doctrine on the limits of legislative discretion regarding citizenship iure sanguinis, which could become part of the constitutional criteria when evaluating Law 74/2025.

In response to the alleged violation of the concept of "the people" in Article 1 of the Constitution, the Court noted that the Constitution does not provide a rigid definition. Instead, it "invokes the idea of citizenship as belonging to a community that has common cultural and linguistic roots, but, at the same time, designs a community open to pluralism and that protects minorities." As commented by Professor Gianluca Scharchillo, this broadened scope of the cultural community may play a role in future interpretations of the new law. This connects with what Professor Diego Corapi considers the "Italian style" in law: a tradition based on a community of family, where the bond with one's kin is paramount and cannot be quantitatively measured.

The ruling reinforces the Court's oversight role: "it is for this Court to ascertain; by the standard of non-manifest unreasonableness and disproportionality, that the norms governing the acquisition of the status civitatis... do not resort to criteria that are completely extraneous to constitutional principles." Avvocato Silvia Contestabile and Professor Nicola Brutti suggest that the phrase "criteria completely extraneous" could refer to Decree-Law 36, potentially providing a minimal opening for future challenges to the new law.

Regarding compliance with European Union law, particularly Article 9 of the TEU and Article 20 of the TFEU, the Court found no reason to question Law 91/1992. It reaffirmed the principle from the Micheletti case that "the determination of the modes of acquisition and loss of citizenship falls, in accordance with international law, within the competence of each Member State." However, it also acknowledged that this competence "must be exercised in compliance with Union law," citing cases like Rottmann. The Court noted that EU jurisprudence has evolved, first censuring Member State regulations that cause a loss of EU citizenship without an individual examination, and more recently, extending its review to the rules for granting citizenship.

The Constitutional Court criticized the lower courts' requests, stating: "The characteristics of a manipulative and systemic intervention... emerge with further clarity when one considers that this Court would be called upon to decide... which one or ones are suitable to sufficiently demonstrate that... belonging to the family unit continues to perform its function of justifying belonging to the state community." The Court added that "the generic nature and manipulative character of the challenges become all the more evident when one considers that the referring judges do not even engage with the considerable variety of scenarios that their proposed intervention would potentially affect." This critique, which also mentions those who "possess the status filiationis," could help construe the doctrine of established rights further.

The judgment concludes that Law 91/1992 was not contrary to EU and international law. However, the principles stated in the judgment, linked to binding EU law and jurisprudence, could serve as guiding criteria for interpreting the constitutional requirements for any future removal of citizenship rights, such as those in Law No. 74/2025.

As Professor Scharchillo commented, this ruling is a victory for clarity. While some intended to close a chapter on the past, they have opened the door to new interpretations, including for the new legislation. It also refutes the narrative that the 1992 law was a European anomaly contrary to Italian sovereignty, with Professor Scharchillo noting that countries like Poland, Croatia, Romania, and Bulgaria also have unlimited ius sanguinis, sometimes with constitutional protection.

The judgment also clarifies that the concept of "community" is much broader than the concept of "the people," which is dependent on citizenship, not the other way around. This serves to overcome a past where racial laws, such as those under fascism, were part of the legal system.

An interesting conclusion drawn by various scholars and attorneys through thorough and demanding analysis that found Law 91/1992 to be reasonable and proportionate could pose significant challenges for the new law if it were subjected to the same rigorous scrutiny. This can only be tested by future rulings. On the question of whether "the People" or "citizenship" comes first, the Court prioritizes citizenship, which may affect the new law.

The Court did not grant the request by some of the parties to directly analyze the constitutionality of the new Law No. 74/2025, particularly with respect to its applicability in time (since the new law is - in theory - at least partly applicable backwards, in contrast to the general principles of the Italian system) as this question was not part of the original ones. Therefore, a decision on that issue - which is particularly relevant - must await the ordinanza from the Court of Turin, referred in mid-June and still pending a hearing (likely to happen in early 2026). It is expected that courts in other jurisdictions may also present questions of constitutionality in the coming months, potentially expanding the scope of the review beyond the issues raised by Turin.

In the meantime, as Avvocato Marco Mellone has commented, the current judgment could significantly condition the ratione temporis (temporal applicability) of the new law for those born before March 28, 2025. Our legal counsel, Avvocato Alberto Lama also underlined the importance of the expected ruling from the Sezioni Unite of the Court of Cassation, which may precede the Constitutional Court's decision on the Turin referral and could reference this judgment.

While no future ruling can be anticipated with certainty, this judgment provides a clear advancement, establishing a positive constitutional doctrine on citizenship iure sanguinis that will impact future decisions.

It cannot be excluded that the Italian Government may react to this and future negative rulings with additional administrative and legislative measures that obstruct administrative and judicial requests for citizenship recognition. This moment may still provide a window of opportunity to prepare the necessary documents and eventually file recognition requests in court before other measures are enacted.